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SOGGY DEBT—THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
WIDENS THE SPLIT ON FDCPA
LIABILITY FOR FILING TIME-BARRED
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
Elijah C. Stone*
IN Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Seventh Circuit added itsvoice to the fray over whether filing a time-barred proof of claim in aChapter 13 bankruptcy violates the Fair Debt Collections Practices
Act (FDCPA).1 The divided panel declined to follow the Eleventh Cir-
cuit2 and instead joined the Eighth Circuit3 when it held that filing time-
barred claims is permissible.4 As Chief Judge Wood pointed out in her
dissent, the Owens majority “miss[ed] the boat” on this one.5 However,
the Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to calm the waters,
having granted certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit’s Johnson v. Midland
Funding, LLC decision.6
The facts of the three underlying, consolidated cases are straightfor-
ward. In each, a debt collector filed a proof of claim in the debtor’s Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy for a time-barred debt—that is, a stale debt for which
the statute of limitations had long since expired.7 The debtor then filed
suit and asserted that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt vio-
lated the FDCPA as a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscion-
able means to collect the debt.8 The district court granted the debt
collector’s motion to dismiss, and the debtor appealed.9
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–1692f (2012); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726,
729 (7th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-315 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016).
2. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016).
4. Owens, 832 F.3d at 737.
5. See id. at 740 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
6. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1338,42 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 16-348, 2016 WL 4944674 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (finding that the Bankruptcy
Code did not preclude application of the FDCPA, a question “artfully dodged” in the Elev-
enth Circuit’s earlier Crawford case).
7. Owens, 832 F.3d at 729.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–1692f; Owens, 832 F.3d at 729.
9. Owens, 832 F.3d at 729–30.
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The Owens majority first addressed the debtor’s argument that filing a
time-barred claim is a per se violation of the FDCPA because a “claim”
encompasses only legally enforceable debts.10 The Bankruptcy Code (the
Code) defines a claim as the “right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or un-
secured.”11 The court observed that it would be “strange” to limit a claim
to only legally enforceable debts when two of the examples in the Code—
contingent and unmatured—offer no state law enforcement right.12 Fur-
thermore, focusing on the Code’s definition, which begins with “right to
payment,” the court noted that, in most states, debt does not simply van-
ish when the statute of limitations runs.13 Relying on its prior decision in
McMahon v. LVNV, LLC,14 the court asserted that a creditor with a
time-barred debt must retain “some right to payment, even if recourse is
only grounded in the debtor’s moral obligation to pay.”15 Thus, the court
held that a claim must be “more extensive than the existence of a cause of
action that entitles an entity to bring suit.”16
The majority then buttressed its broad definition of claim by holding
that the Code contemplates a creditor filing claims on stale debt.17 The
court examined two sections of the Code providing that the bankruptcy
court must, upon objection, disallow a claim that is barred by a statute of
limitations.18 Moreover, the court posited that the Code requires a stale
debt to be listed in the schedules in order to be discharged,19 and if the
debt is not discharged, it “remains collectible.”20 Viewing the Code in
whole, the court held that filing a claim on time-barred debt is not inher-
ently misleading or deceptive.21
After concluding that filing a time-barred claim is permitted under the
Code, the court turned to the debtor’s second argument, which is the crux
of the issue—whether filing such a claim violated the FDCPA.22 The
FDCPA’s purpose is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by
debt collectors.”23 It does this, in part, by prohibiting false, deceptive,
10. Id. at 730.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012).
12. Owens, 832 F.3d at 730.
13. Id. at 731.
14. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014).
15. Owens, 832 F.3d at 731.
16. Id. (quoting In re Keeler, 440 B.R. 354, 362 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
17. Id. at 732.
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(1), 558 (2012); Owens, 832 F.3d at 732.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012) (“[T]he court shall grant . . . a discharge of all debts
provided for by the plan.”).
20. Owens, 832 F.3d at 732. The dissent argued that the majority “miss[ed] the boat” in
making this statement because a statute of limitations provides a complete shield against
collection and does not need to be supplemented by a discharge in bankruptcy. Id. at 740
(Wood, C.J., dissenting).
21. Owens, 832 F.3d at 734 (majority opinion).
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
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misleading, unfair, or unconscionable conduct in connection with the col-
lection of any debt.24 The debtor argued that filing a time-barred claim
violated the FDCPA because the business model of the debt collector
exploits inefficiencies and failures of the bankruptcy process, compelling
collection on what is legally uncollectible.25 The debtor relied on the Sev-
enth Circuit’s prior opinion in Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC,26 which
outlined three primary reasons for holding that filing a lawsuit on time-
barred debt violated the FDCPA: (1) the consumer may not recall the
debt or have documentation to raise a limitations defense; (2) few con-
sumers would be aware that time is a defense; and (3) even if the con-
sumer is aware of the statute of limitations, she may give in rather than
embarrass herself by going to court.27 However, the majority rejected an
attempt to analogize state court proceedings to bankruptcy proceedings
and reasoned that the concerns in Phillips are “less acute” in
bankruptcy.28
The Owens court downplayed the three concerns of Phillips by provid-
ing three mitigating distinctions found in bankruptcy proceedings.29 First,
the court noted that, unlike a lawsuit, a proof of claim must “inform the
debtor about the age and origin of the debt.”30 The “consumer [there-
fore] need not have a memory of it or records documenting it to file an
objection—the affirmative defense is evident on the face of the claim.”31
Second, debtors “usually” hire an attorney who would be aware of a stat-
ute of limitations defense.32 And, even if a debtor is not represented, “a
bankruptcy trustee who is duty-bound[33] to object to improper claims is
appointed to oversee the proceedings.”34 Third, the court supposed that a
debtor, by filing a bankruptcy case, has “demonstrated a willingness to
participate” and is “unlikely to give in rather than fight the claim.”35
After minimizing Phillips, the court then applied the “competent attor-
ney” standard, rather than the “unsophisticated consumer” standard, to
evaluate the debt collector’s conduct.36 In assessing an alleged violation
of the FDCPA, the unsophisticated consumer standard asks “whether a
person of modest education and limited commercial savvy would be
likely to be deceived,” while the competent attorney standard asks
24. §§ 1692e–1692f.
25. Owens, 832 F.3d at 734.
26. Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013).
27. Owens, 832 F.3d at 734 (citing Phillips, 736 F.3d at 1079).
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id. at 735–36.
30. Id. at 735.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 736.
33. Although the Owens majority did not cite to a statute, it is most likely referring to
the Chapter 13 trustee’s duties in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (2012), which incorporate the
duties of Chapter 7 trustees listed in 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (“The trustee shall . . . if a
purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any
claim that is improper.”).
34. Owens, 832 F.3d at 736.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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whether an attorney of average competence would be deceived.37 The
court opined that the unsophisticated consumer standard is inappropriate
to evaluate whether communications made directly to a debtor’s lawyer
violated the FDCPA.38 Because it was undisputed that the debtor was
represented by counsel during the bankruptcy proceedings, the court
found that the competent attorney standard applied.39 Under this more
lenient standard, the court found no violation of the FDCPA.40
Chief Judge Wood dissented, challenging first the majority’s treatment
of the Seventh Circuit’s prior decisions in McMahon and Phillips.41 From
McMahon, the majority found implied support for the notion that some
methods of collecting time-barred debts must be permitted.42 The dissent,
however, explained that “[n]othing in McMahon suggested that . . . a de-
mand for payment under color of legal right, is permissible.”43 The dis-
sent pointed out that “‘[s]eeking’ repayment [based on moral obligation]
is one thing,” which “could be accomplished by a polite, non-threatening
letter advising the debtor of the debt’s existence, and the fact that a law-
suit is time-barred.”44 A simple letter, however, “is in stark contrast with
the use of any type of legal process, whether a suit in state court . . . or the
filing of a claim in bankruptcy.”45 Additionally, Phillips held that filing a
lawsuit to collect a stale debt violated the FDCPA.46 The Chief Judge said
that, because the Code does not distinguish bankruptcy proceedings from
the state court proceedings found in McMahon and Phillips, she would
have applied those cases’ prohibition on the use of legal process to collect
time-barred debts to the bankruptcy context as well.47
The dissent then admonished the majority for viewing the Code in iso-
lation from the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the Rules).48
Specifically, under Rule 9011, by filing a proof of claim, the debt collector
“is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, . . . the claims . . . are warranted by existing law.”49 The Chief Judge
announced that the public policy of Rule 9011 requires that any debt sub-
ject to “an ironclad statute of limitations defense . . . should not be eligi-
ble to be submitted in a proof of claim.”50
Additionally, the dissent took issue with the majority’s idealistic view,
which assumed that debtors are “usually” represented by counsel.51 It
37. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2007).
38. Owens, 832 F.3d at 736.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 736–37
41. Id. at 737–38 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 731 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 738 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. (emphasis in original).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 737.
47. Id. at 738.
48. Id. at 739.
49. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)(2) (emphasis added).
50. Owens, 832 F.3d at 739-40 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 740.
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noted that roughly nine percent of debtors in the Northern District of
Illinois went unrepresented by counsel.52 The dissent said that “[i]t is un-
realistic to think that the pro se litigant or the busy trustee will catch
every scheduled stale claim.”53 Indeed, according to the dissent, the only
reason a debt collector will file a time-barred claim is in the “hope that it
will slip through the cracks and be reborn as an allowed claim in bank-
ruptcy.”54 Even though the majority may have left room to later find a
violation when a debtor is not represented by counsel and the trustee fails
to object to the claim, the dissent doubted a favorable result for that
debtor given the majority’s rationale.55 The dissent declared that it would
follow the Eleventh Circuit and hold that knowingly filing a proof of
claim on a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA.56
This Note does not attempt to quibble with the majority’s broad defini-
tion of claim as it applies in the bankruptcy context. The Eleventh Circuit
in Johnson (the sole circuit finding a violation of the FDCPA for filing a
time-barred claim) held that “[t]here is no blanket prohibition on filing a
time-barred claim in bankruptcy.”57 The Johnson court found that the
FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code peacefully coexist, one overlaying the
other, “so as to provide an additional layer of protection against [debt
collectors].”58 Thus, even if the Owens court correctly defined claim, it
still erred in holding that filing such a claim is permitted by the FDCPA.
To truly grasp why the majority incorrectly decided this case, it is help-
ful to get a glimpse of what lies under the surface. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) published a study in 2013, which found that the nine
largest debt buyers in the industry purchased over $142 billion in debt on
the cheap, averaging a mere $0.045 for every dollar of debt.59 The FTC’s
study further found that, while most states’ statutes of limitations were
between three and six years, 19.3% of debt purchased was between three
and six years old (over $27 billion), and 12.1% of the debt was greater
than six years old (over $17 billion).60 Meanwhile, in 2015, over 300,000
Chapter 13 bankruptcies were filed.61 LVNV alone participated in 69,064
52. Id. This percentage does not, and cannot, reflect the percentage of debtors that
were underrepresented—that is, debtors who receive practically, but not constitutionally,
ineffective assistance of counsel.
53. Id. at 740–41.
54. Id. at 741.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 16-348, 2016 WL 4944674 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016).
58. Id.
59. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING
INDUSTRY T-2 tbl. 2 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/structure-practices-debt-buying-in-
dustry [https://perma.cc/2XCE-QL4C].
60. Id. at 42–43, T-2 tbl 2.
61. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS JUDICIAL FACTS
AND FIGURES, tbl 7.3 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/73/judicial-facts-and-
figures/2015/09/30 [https://perma.cc/EHM4-U4RQ].
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of those bankruptcies and filed 107,608 claims.62 Extrapolating the per-
centages established by the FTC, elementary arithmetic would estimate
that, of the claims LVNV filed in 2015, more than 20,000 claims (19.3% x
107,608) were a mix of time-barred and non-time-barred, and more than
13,000 claims (12.1% x 107,608) were likely time-barred. LVNV is just
one creditor—the problem is rife.
With this perspective, one can see that the majority failed to properly
consider the “deluge” that is drowning the bankruptcy process.63 Indeed,
“[t]he phenomena of bulk debt purchasing has proliferated and the un-
controlled practice of filing claims . . . presents a challenge for the bank-
ruptcy system.”64 The economics are simple. If a debt buyer purchases a
portfolio of time-barred debt for around 4.5 pennies on the dollar65—
very likely a high estimate for time-barred debt66—the debt collector can
still turn a profit so long as five percent of the debt slips through unno-
ticed and gets paid. At least one bankruptcy court has described part of
the issue: “Chapter 13 trustees in this district do not object to proofs of
claim based on statute of limitations defenses . . . because [it] . . . would
require trustees to examine the details of virtually every unsecured proof
of claim, which is simply impracticable.”67 This impracticability is the
only reason debt collectors file these claims to begin with, for “if trustees
performed their duties flawlessly, [debt collectors] would have little in-
centive to engage in [this] scheme.”68 Under this scheme, debt collectors
are rewarded only when the system breaks down and fails.
The majority also sidestepped the powerful policies behind statutes of
limitations. The Supreme Court described statutes of limitations as “a
pervasive legislative judgment that . . . ‘the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’”69 The legisla-
tures in every state provide what they consider a reasonable time to col-
lect on a claim, but after that, the statutes kick in to “protect defendants
and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for
truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by . . .
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”70 These
policies should not vanish once a debtor files bankruptcy, for the Su-
preme Court has also famously cautioned that state law property rights
should not be examined differently solely on account of a bankruptcy fil-
62. AM. INFOSOURCE, AIS INSIGHT: 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW 14 (2016), http://www
.americaninfosource.com/assets/AIS%20Insight_2015%20Annual.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R35L-DJ4T].
63. See Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014).
64. In re Andrews, 394 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008).
65. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 59, at T-2 tbl. 2 (referring to the average
price paid for all debt purchased).
66. See Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 2015) (“LVNV
buys ‘uncollectable’ debts at a discount—the older the debts, the greater the discount.”).
67. In re Edwards, 539 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
68. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 534 (4th Cir. 2016) (Diaz, J., dissenting).
69. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
70. Id.
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ing.71 After all, a debtor files bankruptcy to get a “fresh start”—indeed,
to be free of debt—not to enable uncollectible debt to rise from the
deep.72
Finally, the majority erred when it applied the competent attorney
standard rather than the unsophisticated consumer standard. The unso-
phisticated consumer standard “takes into account that consumer-protec-
tion laws are not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—
that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the
credulous.”73 The precedent relied upon by the majority carved out an
exception to the unsophisticated consumer standard when the debt col-
lector sends a communication, such as a letter, directly to the consumer’s
lawyer, as directed by the statute.74 The idea is that a lawyer can explain a
letter to his client.75 However, this narrow exception does not apply to
the proof of claim context. Filing a proof of claim is neither a collection
letter nor a communication sent directly to a lawyer. It is conduct—legal
action—in an attempt to collect a debt, aimed directly at the debtor.
Therefore, this conduct should have been evaluated under the unsophisti-
cated consumer standard, which likely would have led to a very different
result in this case.
The problem of stale debt collection in bankruptcy has been, no doubt,
a difficult one to address for many of the courts that have considered it.
In fact, the issue divided another panel in the Fourth Circuit shortly after
Owens.76 Tellingly, a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court has
been granted in the Eleventh Circuit’s Johnson decision.77 While a peti-
tion for certiorari has also been filed in the present Owens case, as of the
writing of this note, the petition is still pending.78 Hopefully, the high
court will take up Owens as well and settle the issue.
When the Supreme Court considers Johnson (and if it takes up
Owens), it will find that the result is binary. It must decide whether or not
filing a time-barred claim is a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or un-
conscionable means to collect the time-barred debt. The Fourth Circuit
has offered up a solution not to impose FDCPA liability but to allocate
additional resources to trustees.79 Presumably, this proposal gives trust-
ees the armada they need to review the details of the millions of proofs of
71. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created
and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”).
72. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
73. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2014).
74. See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir.
2007).
75. See id. at 773 (“The lawyer receives the notice and shares it with, or explains it to,
his client.”).
76. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2016).
77. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, cert. granted, No. 16-348, 2016
WL 4944674 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016).
78. Owens, 832 F.3d 726, petition for cert. filed, No. 16-315 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016).
79. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d at 531.
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claims filed every year.80 This solution is inefficient at best. To get to the
right answer, one should look to the two possible results. On the one
hand, allowing time-barred claims in bankruptcy only further burdens
debtors, trustees, and courts when the Bankruptcy Code contemplates
that such claims never be paid. On the other hand, finding a violation
would simply put a stop to the practice without overburdening debt col-
lectors.81 The FDCPA’s purpose is to “eliminate abusive debt collection
practices.”82 As debt collectors continue to flood the bankruptcy system
with unfounded claims, the FDCPA remains the only lifeboat in sight.
80. See AM. INFOSOURCE, supra note 62, at 18.
81. Finding a violation would not impose uncircumscribed liability for debt collectors.
There is a statutory damage cap of $1,000 (plus attorney’s fees) in addition to a safe harbor
provision for debt collectors who do not intentionally file a time-barred claim. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(a), (c) (2012).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
